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Over the past decade the United States has been developing a greater capability to fight a nuclear 
war.  Despite President Obama's famous call in 2009 for a nuclear-free world, he presided over a 
thorough and costly upgrade of the US nuclear arsenal and approved new tactical nuclear weapons 
and counterforce intelligence systems designed for war-fighting rather than deterrence.1 The Obama 
White House did not announce a radical new doctrine along these lines, nor did it rapidly push 
through new programs. The new President, Donald J. Trump, has not publicly articulated an official 
new policy on nuclear use. What can be said is that the Pentagon continues to make a clear effort to 
sustain and enhance America's ability to fight and win a nuclear war.  At the same time, several 
scholars are developing new concepts of nuclear strategy and its necessary correlate, winnable 
nuclear war.2  
 
As Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, two of the most prominent of these scholars, acknowledge, the new 
strategy has attracted serious criticism.  A conspicuous U.S. buildup is likely to embolden hawks in 
other nuclear-armed states to demand similar systems, critics contend, thus triggering an arms race.  
Moreover, a continued and possibly increased U.S. reliance upon nuclear weapons undermines its 
position as a proponent of nuclear nonproliferation:  a state cannot easily insist that others eschew 
the bomb for the purposes of nuclear peace if its military bristles with nuclear weapons.3 
 
Another criticism, and one that has long been made of nuclear strategy, is that it fails to heed the 
logic of the nuclear revolution.  As Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Kenneth Waltz, and, most 
systematically, Robert Jervis have argued,4 the costs of nuclear war are so potentially catastrophic 
that states will always be averse to initiating one, and so ought to rely on nuclear weapons only for 
deterrence amidst a condition of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).  Because, in an age of 
thermonuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles, even a few nuclear strikes on urban 
targets will wreak more death and destruction than any nation has experienced in any conventional 
war, and because the ‘fog’ of a limited nuclear war is likely to foment escalation toward full-scale 
conflict, political leaders recognise that any deliberate use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear 
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powers threatens to exact horrific, and potentially existential costs.5  As Ronald Reagan declared in 
1984, ‘A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought.’6  
 
Strategists reply that states do not, in actual practice, act according to the logic of the nuclear 
revolution.  They have built nuclear arsenals far greater than has been needed for basic deterrence, 
developed war-winning and first-strike strategies, and initiated crises which ran the risk of the 
nuclear war they are supposed to abhor.  We may wish that they do otherwise, but this amounts to a 
normative complaint rather than an analysis of international behaviour.  These strategists conclude 
that the nuclear revolution has had little purchase in the real world of international politics.   
 
The strategists' critique, however, misses the most salient consequence of the nuclear revolution: the 
determination of leaders to avert nuclear war.  They may approve of war-fighting strategies and 
arms buildups, voice dissatisfaction with the international order, or push conflicts toward crisis, but 
as a crisis escalates toward war and the specter of nuclear apocalypse emerges, they find some way 
to step back from the brink.  The salience of the nuclear revolution, in other words, hinges not on 
declared policies and rhetoric, but on the grasp by those with their finger on the button that they 
must not start a war which could kill hundreds of millions, destroy their countries beyond repair, 
and threaten human existence.7  It is this determination that really underlies the nuclear revolution 
and most specifically accounts for the absence of nuclear war, and indeed any major war between 
nuclear powers since 1945, a fact that remains the most obvious evidence in support of the nuclear 
revolution.  As Kenneth Waltz has memorably put it, leaders may talk tough and push matters 
toward conflict, but when the possibility of nuclear war arises they ‘have an overriding incentive to 
ask themselves one question: how do we get out of this mess without nuclear weapons exploding?’8 
 
This article, a study of the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's engagement with the problem of 
nuclear war during the 1950s and early 1960s, provides an historical account of this effect at work.  
Using recently declassified evidence from several archives, some of it never seen before, we show 
how Khrushchev quickly recognized that the advent of thermonuclear bombs and missiles made 
major war insane, and how he acted upon this recognition in his continuing competition with the 
United States.  Khrushchev did not believe that the Cold War had come to an end:  he built new 
weapons systems, instigated crises, and engaged in belligerent rhetoric.  But underlying this 
behaviour was a profound conviction that a nuclear war must never happen.9   
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 The historical narrative proceeds as follows. First, we outline Khrushchev's arrival at the conclusion 
that nuclear war was unwinnable during the first two years of his leadership, a policy he announced 
openly in his famous ‘peaceful coexistence’ speech in 1956.  Second, we discuss Khrushchev's new 
foreign policy of bluster, whereby he talked tough about risking war in various Cold War hotspots, 
and then initiated the Berlin ultimatum crisis of 1958-59. Third, we describe his development of a 
new policy of basic nuclear deterrence and Cold War détente in 1959 and 1960, and his 
abandonment of this policy after the collapse of the Paris Summit in 1960.  Fourth, we examine 
Khrushchev's diplomacy during the Berlin Wall and Cuban crises, and in particular the combination 
of confident rhetoric and acute war aversion that marked his behaviour during these two well-
known showdowns.  In the conclusion, we specify how Khrushchev's policies and actions 
substantiate the case for the nuclear revolution, and discuss some implications of this argument for 
contemporary policy.    
 
Khrushchev, the Soviet Tradition, and the Dawn of the Nuclear Revolution 
 
Since the days of the Soviet revolution, Marxist-Leninists had regarded great-power war as a 
natural and inevitable product of imperialism, and this doctrine was not abandoned by Soviet 
leaders during the first several years of the nuclear age.10  Following the Soviet test of its own 
atomic bomb in 1949, the Kremlin continued to plan for a nuclear third world war; Stalin, not long 
before his death, declared that only the destruction of imperialism would eliminate the inevitability 
of war.11  Indeed, in an interview with Milovan Djilas at the end of World War Two, Stalin had 
predicted that the great powers of the world would recover for fifteen or twenty years, and then 
‘we'll have another go at it.’12  He did not believe that nuclear weaponry invalidated this law of 
history.   
 
Yet Soviet leaders after Stalin's death were beginning to have doubts.  This was in part simply a 
consequence of availability of new information on the nature of nuclear weapons, which, though it 
did not yet appear in the Soviet press, regularly landed on the desks of the top Soviet decision-
makers. This, for instance, included the April 21, 1953 article by the New York Times science 
correspondent William L. Lawrence, ‘How Hellish is the H-bomb?’ The article, published in Look 
Magazine, described how an H-bomb would vaporize its surroundings and how, even if dropped in 
the middle of the Pacific Ocean, it would produce radiation that would eventually drift towards the 
United States, killing millions.  Whereas ordinary Americans would have read this article without 
incident, in the U.S.S.R. it picked up a ‘top secret’ classification and was circulated to just twenty-
three party and government leaders, first and foremost the new Prime Minister Georgii Malenkov.13  
Malenkov also received reports on Soviet nuclear testing, including the August 1953 summary of 
the successful test of the boosted fission weapon, which described horrendous destruction at the site 
of the blast, much worse than any previous explosions in the area.14  It was Malenkov who first took 
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interest in the subject of protecting the Soviet population from effects of a nuclear war, issuing 
instructions as early as July 21, 1953 to study the matter.15 Unsurprisingly, he also made the first 
authoritative pronouncement on the changed character of war on March 12, 1954. In a speech that 
was published in the main Soviet newspaper Pravda, he stated that a nuclear war could mean the 
‘destruction of world civilization.’16 
 
Malenkov’s speech triggered an unhappy reaction in the senior ranks of the Soviet leadership, 
including then-Deputy Minister of Defence Georgii Zhukov and the First Party Secretary, Nikita 
Khrushchev.  Was Malenkov rejecting the long-standing assumption that the imperialists' wars 
would be their undoing?  Khrushchev pursued the matter, and on 1 April received an article from 
Igor Kurchatov (inventor of the Soviet A-bomb) which explored these very issues.17  The article 
spelled out what Soviet atomic scientists called the ‘grim prospects’ for the nuclear age: ‘Keeping in 
mind that the modern military technology gives the country that possesses atomic weapons the 
ability to strike locations thousands of kilometers from its borders, and given that it is practically 
impossible to protect oneself against such atomic weapons, it becomes clear the massive use of 
these weapons will lead to the annihilation of the warring states.’18  Khrushchev was surprised by 
these revelations and even called Kurchatov for additional explanations.  Kurchatov told him that 
the article actually understated the impact of a nuclear war.19 
 
Nevertheless, the First Secretary was not quite yet willing to openly adopt Malenkov’s point of 
view. Instead, he used the Prime Minister’s slip as a weapon of power struggle.  When in January 
1955 Malenkov was ousted from his position, his remarks were cited as proof that he was not 
sufficiently class-conscious. It fell to the hardline Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to condemn 
Malenkov’s theoretical shortcomings at the Communist Party Plenum on January 31, 1955.  
Dismissing Malenkov’s defence that he simply ‘overlooked’ the issue, Molotov argued that his 
remarks had been ‘politically incorrect’ and ‘demobilizing,’ and that he had confused the 
international communist movement: ‘A hundred years ago Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto. 
He said that things are heading towards the collapse of capitalism and towards the victory of 
Communism. … If we are now saying that some kind of war can allegedly lead to […] the end of 
the entire civilization, this means that we have something quite opposite from the head on our 
shoulders.’20 The Plenum roared in laughter.  
 
Khrushchev thus was aware of the political dangers of rejecting the concept of inevitable war; in 
May 1955 he remarked that ‘the war has been merely postponed. We talk about peace but create 
atomic and hydrogen bombs.’21 By inertia more than genuine belief, he continued to endorse the 
Stalinist thesis to the effect that ‘You cannot fight just with bombs. You have to fight with people.’22  
But by the end of 1955 Khrushchev’s thinking underwent a profound shift, both in terms of what a 
future war may look like, and also whether it could even be fought.  This new thinking was clearly 
in evidence in December, when the Soviet leadership discussed the possibility of a peace treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the United States.  
 
The idea of this peace treaty was discussed at the Presidium on December 8 and 15; the text of the 
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memorandum was debated and changed.  But one passage – referring to the impact of atomic and 
hydrogen weapons – was left completely unaltered. These new weapons, the passage read, ‘put 
people of all countries into a similarly dangerous position… threatening to subject their territories, 
and, first and foremost, the densely populated regions of the highly developed countries, to the 
devastating effects of an atomic war.’23  Curiously, when the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed 
similar formulations in a different memorandum (on the eve of the Geneva conference in July 
1955), the idea that the Soviet Union – among others – would also be devastated in a nuclear war 
was explicitly rejected, replaced with a vague reference to destruction of countries participating in 
such a war.24  But by January 1956, the Soviet leaders were talking about a nuclear war as an 
existential threat.  Thus, the head of the Supreme Soviet, Kliment Voroshilov, announced on January 
13 that war was ‘invented by savages. They moved from the bow to the powder, and now such a 
thing has been created, that it goes off once and destroys a whole city, and destroy the population. 
We’ll all die in a few generations.’  These comments were very much in line with Malenkov’s 
earlier thesis, yet Khrushchev, who, was in attendance, did not contradict Voroshilov. He, too, spoke 
about the dangers of war.25  
 
The shift from ‘the capitalists will die’ to ‘we’ll all die’ occurred against the background of the 
successful Soviet test of its first proper hydrogen bomb (on November 22, 1955).  This test both 
excited the Soviet leaders and horrified them, for it became clear that thermonuclear weapons were 
theoretically almost unlimited in their destructive power.  The test report, commenting on the 
practically complete destruction within a 5km radius of the blast and on visible effects as far away 
as 300-400 km, noted that the power of the charge was deliberately reduced by at least 500 kilotons 
for fear of causing too much damage.26  
 
This knowledge gave Khrushchev the confidence to set out the thesis of peaceful coexistence, 
which he did in his report at the 20th CC CPSU Congress on February 14, 1956.  Khrushchev’s 
argument, that the socialist camp had become so strong that it could prevent any attempt by the 
imperialist camp to start war, was discussed at a session of the Presidium on January 30, 1956, 
exactly a year since Malenkov’s ouster.  Even Molotov – one of the more conservative players in 
the leadership – voiced no criticism of Khrushchev’s formulations.27  Khrushchev’s embrace of 
peaceful co-existence was a reflection of a growing political consensus.28  Even as the military 
focused on the practicalities of fighting a nuclear conflict, the Soviet political leadership had 
already abandoned the notion of acceptability of war.  
 
In was in this new political environment that Khrushchev delivered the most famous speech of his 
career. ‘We estimate,’ Khrushchev announced, ‘that the [two] blocs presently possess such means of 
destruction as to make war unthinkable, if not impossible.’29  It was either a peaceful Cold War ‘or 
the most destructive war in history,’ Khrushchev said: ‘There is no third way.’  Despite intense 
criticism from orthodox Communists, especially those in Beijing, the Soviet leader was convinced 
that any rational leader understood this.  ‘The danger of a military conflict is absent,’ he explained 
in July of that year.  ‘One gets the impression that in America they talk about war out of fear than 
anything else. They are afraid themselves but they are trying to frighten the others.’30  
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Bluster and Brinkmanship: 1956-59 
 
By early 1956, Khrushchev had decided, in both secret policy debates and public declarations, that 
World War Three was unacceptable in the nuclear age.  This led him to regard conflicts with the 
United States in a new way, but it hardly dissuaded him from taking advantage of the new Soviet 
arsenal for lesser political objectives—to ‘frighten the others.’  Once he realized the tremendous 
power of nuclear weapons, he rarely missed an opportunity to advertise this power, seeing it as very 
advantageous for political leverage.  As early as January 1956 – just weeks before proclaiming 
peaceful coexistence – Khrushchev resorted to atomic saber-rattling in a bid to convince the 
Iranians to quit the UK-led Baghdad Pact. ‘Would you find it very interesting to catch several 
hydrogen bombs in Iran?  Are the Iranian people dreaming about this?  I think not.  Why, then, did 
you join a pact that aims at exactly this?’31  When in June 1956 the Shah visited the Soviet Union, 
Khrushchev reminded him of the Soviet ability to rain destruction on any potential aggressor.  He 
chose not to threaten Iran directly on this occasion but instead lashed out at the Turks for their naïve 
hope that their American friends in case of war. ‘By the time these friends come to their rescue, 
Turkey will be no more.’  Indeed, Khrushchev explained, America itself was increasingly vulnerable 
to a Soviet plane and missile attack. ‘We are not boasting,’ he concluded. ‘Such are the objective 
characteristics of these weapons.’32 
 
But of course Khrushchev was boasting. Not only was he boasting but he was increasingly prone to 
use Soviet achievements to impress and threaten friends and foes alike.  In June and in September 
1956 Khrushchev engaged in atomic diplomacy with visiting Yugoslav delegations – not to 
intimidate this time but merely to stress Soviet military power and so encourage the Yugoslavs to 
close ranks with Moscow. Josep Broz Tito was shown films of nuclear explosions and missile tests. 
The films, at least according to Khrushchev, ‘made an exceptionally strong impression.’ As he wrote 
on October 8, the Yugoslavs concluded that ‘the operation of the hydrogen bomb was so powerful 
that if it were dropped over Belgrade, Zagreb would not survive either.’33  The bomb was a recurrent 
subject of Khrushchev’s discussions with the Chinese leader Mao Zedong. ‘Three-four missiles,’ he 
would tell Mao – no doubt hoping to impress – ‘and there would be no Turkey.’ Ten missiles would 
suffice to destroy the UK. ‘Now, that we have the [inter-]continental missile, we also hold America 
by the throat.  They thought that America is out of reach. But this is not so.’34  
 
Arguably the most famous instance of Khrushchev’s atomic diplomacy occurred during the 1956 
Suez crisis, when, following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez canal, Great Britain, 
France, and Israel launched an abortive invasion of Egypt. On November 5, 1956 the Soviets sent 
letters to the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet with 
a nearly identical demand to back off or else risk an attack from ‘a more powerful state which 
possess all means of modern destructive weapons.’35 The Suez campaign failed for reasons that had 
nothing to do with Khrushchev’s threats.36  However, this was not how Khrushchev saw this 
episode – he believed that it was the Soviet threat that forced the British and the French to call it 
quits.  On many subsequent occasions he cited this alleged achievement and was quite upset that 
Nasser, of all, didn’t seem to buy it.  Khrushchev even complained to Nasser for this lack of faith, 
arguing, in a letter, that ‘we [the Soviets] were prepared for most decisive measures to provide the 
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most effective aid both to Egypt, when it was attacked by the aggressors, and to Syria during the 
Syrian crisis.’37  ‘If the aggressors unleash a war against you,' he reiterated, 'we can provide you 
help with these missiles from our territory.’38  
 
It was one thing to engage in this kind of theatre over peripheral conflicts; Khrushchev was not 
going to decide one morning to nuke Iran for not leaving the Baghdad Pact, or respond to some 
attack on Nasser's Egypt with every available bomb.  It was quite another when alliance obligations 
were involved, as Khrushchev found out in 1958.  It happened shortly after his visit to China in 
July-August 1958, when he boasted to Mao about Soviet nuclear capabilities. In his turn, Mao 
evidently decided to put Khrushchev’s words to the test.  On August 23 the People’s Liberation 
Army unexpectedly began to shell Taiwan-held islands off China’s coast.  Khrushchev, who had not 
been consulted, did not know what to think.  Was this a prelude to China’s invasion of Taiwan – 
and, given Taiwan’s defense ties with the U.S., would this not mean a general war?  Khrushchev 
dispatched his Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for talks with the Chinese.  The Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai told Gromyko on September 7 that China was not counting on the Soviet 
nuclear umbrella.  If the U.S. bombed China, the Chinese leaders did not expect their Soviet allies 
to get involved.  Khrushchev understood Zhou’s words as a test of Moscow’s reliability as an ally. 
On September 19 he drafted a letter to Mao Zedong, which displayed a remarkable grasp of the 
logic of deterrence and credibility.  It was imperative, he said in the letter, not to give the Americans 
any room for doubting the strength of Soviet commitment as an ally.  ‘If the enemy learned about 
this [i.e. about the absence of firm commitment], or even suspected this, it would create a very 
dangerous situation. And we must have a firm agreement on this.’39  On the same day Khrushchev 
sent an open letter to Eisenhower, threatening retaliation in case of an American nuclear strike 
against China: ‘if the PRC comes under such an attack, the aggressor will immediately be repulsed 
with the same means.’40 This time it was not just rhetoric: it was a public expression of a private 
commitment that Khrushchev had clearly made.  
 
Despite the peaceful resolution of the Straits crisis, Khrushchev was unsettled by the experience. 
Mao’s lack of consultation and the strange way in which the crisis ended – with the Chinese 
deciding to shell the islands on every second day – revealed quite plainly that making the sort of 
guarantees that Khrushchev had offered in his letter to Mao put the Soviets at the mercy of 
whatever it was that the Chinese premier had in mind.  Given that Mao repeatedly downplayed the 
perils of nuclear war – ‘if the atomic bomb destroyed the Earth, it might be a major event for the 
solar system but it would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole,’ he once said – it was 
insane to follow the Chinese to the brink over Taiwan or any other issue.41  So, even as Khrushchev 
vowed to stand by Mao and threatened Eisenhower with nuclear war, he was beginning to re-
evaluate his commitment to China, and to think more carefully about the implications of 
brinkmanship.  In 1959 he reneged on his promise to deliver a prototype nuclear bomb to China, 
which he had unwisely made in 1957.  The Sino-Soviet relationship rapidly went downhill after 
that: never again did Khrushchev have to restate his commitment that he so reluctantly made in 
September 1958.  
   
Khrushchev used nuclear bluster in the hopes of brandishing Soviet power on the cheap, secure in 
his conviction that it would never escalate to an actual war. The Taiwan Straits crisis revealed to 
him the limits of this diplomacy: when firm alliance commitments, rather than vague boasts, were at 
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play, other leaders could drag him into a war he was determined to prevent.  But what if the stakes 
were higher?  No sooner had the tensions begun to ease in the Taiwan Straits that Khrushchev found 
himself saddled with a thornier problem on the western flank of the socialist camp. Trouble was 
brewing in Berlin, and this time it was Khrushchev, not Mao, who was responsible for the unfolding 
crisis.  
 
In October 1957 Moscow startled the world by launching the first man-made satellite into space.  
As it beeped triumphantly in the dark skies, Khrushchev embraced ever rosier views of the 
changing balance of forces. The Soviets were advancing. The West was in retreat.  How, then, could 
Khrushchev tolerate the indignity of the Western presence in Berlin? On many occasions the Soviet 
leader referred to Berlin as a sore of Europe, a rotten tooth that had to be pulled out, a thorn, a bone 
in his throat. On many occasions he described American efforts to hang on to Berlin as an attempt 
to ‘humiliate’ the Soviets, ‘bring us down to our knees.’42 At last, Khrushchev came up with a plan 
to resolve the Berlin problem. On November 10, 1958, at a Polish-Soviet ‘friendship rally,’ he 
announced his intention to turn over control over access to Berlin to the East German regime.43  
Although he was initially unclear about what exactly this meant for the Western occupying powers, 
by the end of the month he removed any doubt:  Berlin was to be made a ‘free city,’ and that meant 
the Western forces had to leave.  The statement the Soviets issued on 27 November was effectively 
an ultimatum, set to expire on 27 May 1959.   
 
Khrushchev’s thinking was largely based on the premise that the Americans would not risk war over 
an outpost well within the Soviet bloc, would not gamble – as he liked to say –with the fates of 
hundreds of millions of people for the sake of just 2.5 million people who were in any case in no 
immediate danger of being forced into life under Communism.  Some of what surely were among 
the strangest discussions of the Soviet Presidium on Berlin centred on this very subject: just how 
likely was it that the Americans would react to Khrushchev’s ultimatums by going to war?  
Khrushchev’s rule of thumb was that the probability of a general war over Berlin was about five 
percent.44 To look at this from the other end of the stick: that meant 95 percent estimated success – 
excellent odds for a gambler! Khrushchev seemed willing to take the risk: ‘you won’t get anywhere 
without taking a risk. We cannot beg for anything from our opponents – we can only grab,’ he 
would say.  But there was something not quite right – and Khrushchev knew it.  
 
To understand what it was, it is important to recount an anecdote that Khrushchev liked to tell about 
Berlin. Once, he would say, an officer went to a ball and accidentally farted. The officer was so 
dismayed by this embarrassment that he went outside and blew his brains out. ‘Of course, it is 
impolite to spoil the air but why shoot yourself?’45  In comparison to the fate of civilization, the 
occupation of Berlin was just a ‘fart,’ but was Khrushchev himself willing to pull the trigger if his 
gamble failed and the West resorted to force?  The five percent estimate left this possibility wide 
open.  Khrushchev’s willingness to take a risk to redress an indignity never quite outweighed his 
fear of inadvertently causing a nuclear war.  
 
That is why Khrushchev backtracked almost as soon as he announced the ultimatum.  In January 
1959 he sent his confidante Anastas Mikoyan to Washington to inform the White House that, 
despite all appearances, his demand was ‘not an ultimatum,’ and he told the Presidium on February 
                                                 
42  This formula became even more popular during the 1961 crisis.  See, for example, Khrushchev’s fourth meeting 
with John F. Kennedy in Vienna, June 4, 1961, RGANI: fond 52, opis 1, delo 468, listy 76-80. 
43  Record of the Presidium meeting, November 6, 1958 in A.A. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS,   338-339. For a 
detailed discussion see Douglas Selvage, ‘Khrushchev’s November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the 
Polish Archives,’ Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 11, p. 200.  
44  Khrushchev stated this estimate on a number of occasions, including in the Presidium discussions. See e.g. 
Prezidium TsK KPSS, p. 503.  
45  Nikita Khrushchev’s conversation with John J. McCloy, July 26, 1961, RGANI: fond 52, opis 1, delo 581, listy 91-
143. 
11 that, subject to certain restrictions, he was prepared to let the West keep some troops in West 
Berlin.46  When the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan turned up in Moscow later that 
month, Khrushchev reiterated that the 27 May deadline ‘had no particular significance… It could be 
June 27 or August 27 or the West could name a date.’47  In June, after his original deadline expired 
without any change, Khrushchev wrote a private letter to Eisenhower, suggesting that a general 
great-power summit could lead to a resolution of the issue.48  When Khrushchev mentioned to a 
U.S. delegation in Moscow in early July that he would be willing to visit the United States to pursue 
these goals, Eisenhower invited him to America, an expression of interest in working toward a 
general Cold War deal.  Khrushchev’s discussions with Eisenhower in September 1959 created a 
new atmosphere in Soviet-American relations, the ‘Camp David moment.’  The Berlin problem – 
though it still lurked in the background – lost much of its intensity, and it briefly seemed that it 
would be side-lined altogether in the broader process of détente, based (Khrushchev never lost sight 
of this point) on the mutual recognition of the other’s capacity to inflict unacceptable damage. The 
two statesmen agreed to meet at a summit in 1960.49 
 
Towards Nuclear Reform 
 
The long-awaited summit with President Eisenhower was symbolically important to Khrushchev: it 
ratified the Soviet leader’s equal status and strengthened his domestic standing.  Now he could 
claim before his colleagues that the policy of peaceful coexistence had borne fruit: the Soviet Union 
formally graduated to the rank of a superpower.  He understood, and readily emphasized publicly 
and privately, that this status rested more than anything on Soviet nuclear capability: the ability to 
destroy any potential enemy, even the United States.  Although the Soviet ICBM programme was 
still it its infant phase and (despite Khrushchev’s famous boast to churn out missiles like sausages) 
Moscow did not really develop a comprehensive second strike capability until the late 1960s, 1959 
was a turning point precisely because of that acknowledgement of Soviet power that Khrushchev’s 
meeting with Eisenhower signified.  But there was also a less pleasing aspect of Khrushchev’s 
American tour.  The Soviet leader now acutely realized just how far the Soviet Union still had to go 
before it could ‘catch up’ with the United States.  
 
In late 1959, Khrushchev developed a ‘grand design,’ as Naftali and Fursenko call it, to address 
both the danger of nuclear war, and his inferior economy, at once.  In December, Khrushchev 
submitted a memorandum to the Central Committee Presidium.  He stressed the recent progress in 
the development of the Soviet nuclear deterrent force, and concluded that Soviet nuclear capability 
was sufficient to ward off any potential aggressor. ‘How can any country or a group of countries in 
Europe attack us,’ he asked, ‘if we can literally wipe these countries off the face of the Earth with 
our atomic and hydrogen weapons and by delivering our missiles to any spot on the globe?’50 Under 
these circumstances it simply did not make any sense to keep such a large conventional force, so 
Khrushchev proposed to cut a million to a million and a half servicemen, bringing the size of the 
Soviet army to under 2.5 million.  His rationale? The money was badly needed in the development 
of the economy.  Repeatedly, he emphasized that Moscow’s defence potential would not be 
undermined, even if its disarmament were not reciprocated by the West.  Indeed, Khrushchev 
believed that a continued large American conventional army would be a budgetary drag, and so help 
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the Soviets in their economic competition with the United States.51  When this memorandum was 
discussed by the Presidium on December 14, there was no opposition.  All of the military brass – 
many of whom were Khrushchev appointees – backed their leader.  Khrushchev personally 
announced the cuts in a speech on January 14.52  
 
Khrushchev’s proposal of these dramatic unilateral reductions overlapped with a number of key 
developments.  First, on the same day as he discussed his memorandum with colleagues in the 
Presidium, Khrushchev set out his vision for building a Communist society in the USSR within 10-
15 years.  In 1961 this vision was officially inaugurated in the Third Party Programme, which 
promised a better life under Communism to the present generation of the Soviet people.  Clearly, in 
Khrushchev’s mind, a much cheaper Soviet military was central to his economic initiative.  Second, 
just three days after the December 17 Presidium discussion the Soviets officially established 
Strategic Rocket Forces as a branch of the military establishment:  the first nuclear-tipped ICBMs 
were put into service in December 1959-January 1960.  At the time there were only just a dozen of 
these ICBMs, far below the hundreds of missiles bandied about by American ‘missile gap’ 
alarmists.  Of course, more were on the way.  But it is quite clear that Khrushchev felt that whatever 
deterrent the Soviet Union possessed already, it was sufficient to deter an American or anyone else’s 
attack. Already by early 1959 he was arguing that the Soviets had stockpiled ‘more than enough’ 
nuclear weapons, and ‘needed no more.’53  ‘The number of hydrogen bombs we have produced,’ he 
explained to a visitor just two days after the Berlin ultimatum, ‘has already reached the point where 
its further increase does not play any role.’54  ‘At the time when I was still in the leadership,’ 
Khrushchev recalled years later, ‘we accumulated so many missiles and nuclear charges that we 
decided even then: ‘That’s enough!’ You could of course replace outdated missiles with more 
modern ones, but there were more than enough of them.’55 
 
There was a difference, as far as Khrushchev was concerned, between having the capability to 
completely destroy versus the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the probable enemy.  He 
knew very well that in early 1960 the Soviet Union did not have the capability to completely 
destroy the United States. This, he revealed, citing his own General Staff, would require three 
hundred ICBMs – a lot more than the modest Soviet force then being deployed.56  The threshold for 
unacceptable damage was much, much lower. He came back from the United States feeling that 
even one nuclear explosion in an American city was too many for President Eisenhower.  ‘Even if 
the arms race stopped [after each side had enough missiles to destroy the other], this would hardly 
make the people’s lives more peaceful,’ Khrushchev told the visiting Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru. ‘They will still live under the barrel of a gun with a cocked trigger, fearing that 
some madman will make the first shot, which will lead to a catastrophe. I think Eisenhower 
understands this. I think [the UK Prime Minister Harold] Macmillan also understands this.’57 
 
In short, whereas until the turn of the decade, Khrushchev enthusiastically pushed for the 
development of the Soviet deterrent force, actually gaining a (limited) nuclear deterrent turned his 
thinking towards the subject of nuclear control. The matter was discussed at the Presidium, where 
Khrushchev suddenly proposed to go beyond his vague calls for general and universal disarmament, 
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and actually consider cutting back on nuclear missiles. ‘They [the Americans] are all literally 
trembling,’ he told his colleagues on February 1, 1960.  ‘… And suddenly we announce that we are 
prepared to destroy ballistic missiles and all rockets… This is a powerful thing, and it will 
powerfully act on the conscience of any reasonable person, especially as our proposal is completely 
sincere.’58 Khrushchev went on to talk about closing down bases, scrapping bombers and other 
means of delivery, even while leaving some deterrent capability in place.  This way, ‘even if a 
madman came to power, he won’t have a knife, he won’t be dangerous, and if he begins to sharpen 
his knife, the others will see that he is a madman, and they’ll be able to tie him down.’59   
 
In 1960, Khrushchev's odd metaphor was put to the test.  His hope, that the Paris summit in May 
(followed by Ike’s scheduled visit to the USSR in June) would enable him to realize his grand 
design, depended upon American reciprocity; this in turn was based upon his belief that Eisenhower 
would be able to fend off the forces of militarism and imperialism which he believed still operated 
in U.S. politics.  Unfortunately, Eisenhower could not control that perception effectively.  Hawkish 
journalists and politicians had given the Soviet leader reason to worry, particularly during the 
missile gap controversy that had been raging in the United States since the Sputnik test of October 
1957:  columnists such as Joseph Alsop and Democratic politicians, including the presidential 
candidate John F. Kennedy, talked of a massive Soviet superiority in nuclear missiles, which no one 
more than Khrushchev knew to be a ridiculous lie—it was the United States which was massively 
ahead, not the USSR.60  What could explain such brazen falsehoods if not the forces of 
imperialism?  ‘It is not the journalists who write it themselves,’ Khrushchev worried, ‘but the 
journalists write about what the government thinks.’61 
 
Much worse, however, was the U-2 fiasco in May.  Eisenhower had approved the last flight of the 
CIA spy plane on May 1, a major Soviet holiday; these flights, ironically, provided the CIA with the 
clearest evidence of the fallacy of the missile gap.  The U-2 plane was shot down by a Soviet 
surface-to-air missile, and the pilot was captured alive.  Eisenhower refused to apologise for the 
mission, or to blame it on the CIA, which Khrushchev regarded as an affront to him personally, and 
to the Soviet Union. ‘This is insolence, insolence!’, he raved at a Moscow exhibition of the 
wreckage of the downed plane, telling the assembled journalists that he was no longer sure that 
Eisenhower, with his ‘thief philosophy,’ would be welcomed in the USSR.62  
 
The problem was the loss of face. Khrushchev could not be seen in parley with his ‘friend’ 
Eisenhower post U-2, as if nothing had happened. ‘My friend,’ ‘my friend,’ he repeated bitterly: 
‘God, save me from friends like this, and I will take care of my enemies.’63  Khrushchev arrived in 
Paris resolved to force Ike to apologize or else ruin the summit.  The May 16 meeting of the four 
powers ‘bl[ew] up, like a volcano! It is ignominious; it is tragic; it is almost incredible,’ recounted 
Harold Macmillan, who tried more than other leaders to save the summit from a meltdown.64 
Khrushchev was unsympathetic and blamed the perfidious Americans with their ‘mania of 
greatness...probably, they think they can do anything because they have [so] many dollars.’65 Now 
that the grand design was falling apart due to what Khrushchev perceived as Washington’s 
unwillingness to treat the Soviets as ‘equals,’ he threatened to increase missile production.66 On 
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June 11, 1960, he forwarded the transcripts of his aborted discussions in Paris to socialist allies, 
including Mao Zedong: he wanted them to know that he stood firm and successfully defended 
Soviet honour.67 
 
Berlin and Cuba 
 
The election of John F. Kennedy as U.S. President in November 1960 focussed Khrushchev’s 
attention on resolving some of the outstanding issues in the Soviet-American relationship, none of 
course more pressing than the Berlin problem, which became even more of a sore in the months that 
passed since the failed Paris summit because of the ongoing exodus of skilled workers across the 
unprotected border into West Berlin.  East Germany’s leader Walter Ulbricht demanded that 
Khrushchev solve the problem or take over the burden of subsidizing the GDR’s faltering economy.  
Meanwhile, the Soviet leader felt that he had promised to sign a treaty with East Germany so many 
times that his prestige was now fully engaged.  He could not back down without losing face. ‘You 
must understand our situation,’ he told JFK’s envoy John J. McCloy. ‘We already announced that 
we would sign the treaty, and [so] made an advance payment.  If we did not sign, this would look 
like retreat, backing down under the pressure of Western countries.’68  In June 1961 Khrushchev 
met with Kennedy in Vienna, and again spoke bitterly about how the Americans wanted to 
‘humiliate our country.’69  The discussion went nowhere, and Khrushchev revived the ultimatum he 
had let elapse in the more confident days of 1959.  On parting, Kennedy gloomily predicted a ‘cold 
winter’ in the months to come.  
 
Khrushchev found himself during the summer of 1961 facing a choice between watching Ulbricht's 
East Germany hemorrhage or following through with his ultimatum and so running a real risk of 
war.  Because both alternatives were unacceptable but the pressure from Ulbricht was relentless. So 
in the end, Khrushchev resorted to building a wall built around West Berlin.  It was a demeaning 
expedient, and hardly an advertisement for the appeal of the communist system, but it solved the 
problem of West Berlin in a way that did not require the expulsion of western forces there and so 
invite the possibility of military confrontation.70  On August 13, 1961 Berliners awoke to the awful 
reality of a divided city.  But that was it: Khrushchev did not sign a treaty with the GDR, and indeed 
continued to talk about Berlin in less and less concrete terms. When the Presidium discussed the 
subject on January 8, 1962, it became patently clear that Khrushchev was content with the status 
quo.  August 13, he said, removed the bone from his throat, and now the bone was in the 
Westerners’ throats: they had to worry about Berlin, not he.71  Khrushchev was no longer anxious to 
stir the pot. ‘The Americans,’ he reflected disingenuously, two weeks after the Wall went up, 
‘[wanted] to scare us but they ended up scaring themselves.’72 In fact, the opposite was equally true: 
it was Khrushchev who wanted to scare the Americans and very much ended up scaring himself.   
 
The barbed wire that now encircled West Berlin solved the immediate problem, but it remained a 
tremendous blow to Soviet and Khrushchev’s prestige. In a bid to compensate for this 
embarrassment, he finally did something that he had successfully resisted for more than two years: 
he authorized the resumption of nuclear testing. It is not clear when the decision was made but it 
was before July 5 (when Khrushchev spilled the beans to the Chinese). In other words, after his 
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meeting with Kennedy in Vienna (which presumably convinced him of the impossibility of 
achieving a breakthrough on the German treaty), Khrushchev began to prepare the ground for the 
grandiose finale of his ill-fated Berlin ultimatum. The highlight of the prestige-saving exercise was 
the testing of the 50 megaton ‘Tsar-bomb’ on October 30, 1961, the most powerful man-made 
explosion in history. The monstrous blast shattered glass in some windows in Finland and Norway 
hundreds of miles from the epicenter.  It was one of the final examples of Khrushchev's 
determination to maintain face in the nuclear age.  
 
The other, and last, example was his decision to deliver nuclear rockets to Cuba.  The Cuban 
Missile Crisis of October 1962 is probably the most written-about episode in the history of the Cold 
War.  Historians still debate why Khrushchev did something as audacious as secretly shipping 
nuclear missiles to an island just 90 miles off the U.S. coast.  Before Soviet records on the crisis 
became available, the tendency among scholars was to interpret his decision as a careful strategic 
calculation.  According to this line of inquiry, the Soviet leader knew only too well that his much-
advertised nuclear deterrent was in fact vastly inferior to that of the United States. There were far 
fewer ICBMs in the arsenal than Khrushchev’s rhetoric suggested and the inflamed American 
public imagination allowed.  To fix this problem, the Soviets decided to put shorter-range missiles 
on Cuban soil.  But it later transpired, mostly from the writing of Russian historians, that 
Khrushchev’s decision was much more emotional than strategic.  The idea – the new narrative 
suggested – was to save Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution from American attack.73 
 
Khrushchev first spoke of missiles in Cuba in a letter to Kennedy in April 1961.  It is not entirely 
clear where he got this idea, though he himself attributed it to statements by Kennedy and other US 
politicians.74  In rambling comments on a draft submitted by the Foreign Ministry, Khrushchev 
drew parallels between the possibility of an offensive Soviet base in Cuba and the reality of such 
bases in countries bordering the USSR.  He clearly felt that the Soviets were not being treated 
fairly.75  As a result of this dictated digression on equality, the April 22 letter ended up being rather 
long and incoherent, and it was effectively dismissed by the State Department. Yet it expressed 
Khrushchev’s deep-held conviction that had also animated his approach to the Berlin problem. The 
matter came down to prestige: if, as Kennedy himself had admitted in Vienna, the United States and 
the Soviet Union were equals, then how could the Soviets be denied what the Americans took for 
granted?  As Khrushchev later put it in his memoirs, justifying his decision to ship missiles to Cuba, 
‘we’d be doing nothing more than giving them [the Americans] a little of their own medicine.’76 
Tellingly, when privately questioned about his views at the very height of the crisis, he reiterated his 
claim that the source of the problem was Washington’s habit to order others about. ‘If the forces are 
equal, then opportunities are also equal. Then one must take into account the power possessed by 
other countries, and build relations in such a way that these forces do not clash because a clash is a 
mutual calamity.’ When people part, Khrushchev added grimly, they say ‘goodnight.’ ‘What hell of 
a goodnight can you talk about, when we are sleeping on a powder keg.’77 
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis reached its height during the week of October 22-28, following Kennedy's 
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decision to establish a naval blockade around the island and demand the removal of the missiles.  
During this week, Khrushchev chose to shelve considerations of personal and national prestige, or 
his passion for Cuban Communism, or perhaps even his strategic calculations, and beat a hasty 
retreat. As soon as he learned of Kennedy’s declaration of a ‘quarantine’ around Cuba, Khrushchev 
warned the commander of the Soviet forces in Cuba, general Issa Pliev, not to use nuclear weapons 
without authorization from Moscow, confirming an earlier such demand on 22 October.78  That 
order essentially negated the purported rationale for sending the missiles in the first place – to 
defend Cuba at all costs – but in an October 25 Presidium discussion, Khrushchev rationalized it 
this way:  ‘It is not to our benefit to fight. The future depends not on Cuba but on our country.’79  
Later that day, he decided to offer the U.S. the deal of removing the missiles in exchange for a non-
invasion pledge, and sent a letter to the White House with this proposal on the 26th.  Encouraged by 
a column by the American journalist Walter Lippmann, on the 27th he sent another letter also 
demanding the removal of U.S Jupiter missiles from Turkey; Kennedy famously agreed to this 
demand as long as it was kept secret, but Khrushchev was already willing to accept the original 
deal, no matter how seriously it damaged Soviet-Cuban relations.  With the specter of 
thermonuclear war looming, each side was ready to offer more than the other was demanding. On 
October 28, Khrushchev publicly accepted Kennedy’s demand to withdraw the missiles. In breach 
of diplomatic practice, his letter was broadcast en clair over the radio: the Soviet leader feared 
delays could inadvertently lead to war.  This was how Castro learned of the deal to remove the 
missiles. 
 
During that fateful week, Khrushchev recognized that his gambit had made a nuclear war seriously 
possible and his response was to negotiate and conciliate to prevent that war.  What one sees in the 
Soviet leader's behavior (and also in Kennedy's) during the last few days of the crisis is a fixation 
upon getting out of the mess he had created, of subordinating every other concern to the immediate 
objective of securing some kind of deal.  Thus it is easy to imagine his reaction to Castro’s 
infamous proposal, written on the night of October 26-27, to strike the Americans first ‘however 
harsh and terrible the solution would be.’80 ‘What is this – temporary madness or the absence of 
brains?’ commented the astonished Soviet leader.81  ‘We were completely aghast,’ he recounted to 
the Czechoslovak leader Antonin Novotny. ‘Castro clearly has no idea about what thermonuclear 
war is. … At the same time, it is clear that with a first strike one cannot today knock the opponent 
out of the fight. There can always be a counter-strike, which can be devastating…. Only a person 
who has no idea what nuclear war means, or who has been so blinded, for instance, like Castro, by 
revolutionary passion, can talk like that.’82  
 
Choosing MAD 
 
What is the ‘nuclear revolution?’  How, precisely, has the development of thermonuclear weaponry 
affected the practice of international politics?  This question has been addressed by several 
authors;83 its effect upon Khrushchev during the 1950s and early 1960s allows us to put forward a 
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distinct definition.  
 
Jervis stresses that the essence of the nuclear revolution lies in the condition of mutual 
vulnerability:  the fact that any nuclear power contending with another in possession of a second-
strike deterrent always remains vulnerable to immediate annihilation, irrespective of either the 
strategies it develops during peacetime or the progress of a limited war between them.  He predicts 
that this condition will produce stability and peace, but also that rational states will shy away from 
confrontation and desist from maximal strategic competition and the quest for first-strike 
superiority.84  It is these latter claims that critics of the nuclear revolution focus upon, by pointing to 
the fact that crises occurred during the Cold War and that the two superpowers built thousands of 
nuclear weapons and developed war-fighting strategies during the last 25 years of the Cold War.85 
 
As we have seen, Khrushchev's policies clearly seem, on one hand, to confirm Jervis's predictions:  
Khrushchev perceived the condition of mutual vulnerability, sought stability, and tried to install a 
strategy of minimum deterrence.  Yet he also engaged in blustery atomic diplomacy, instigated 
crises that brought the world to the brink, and approved of new weapons production in the early 
1960s, even though he had declared that the United States was already deterred by the small Soviet 
arsenal. Does not the latter behaviour contradict the former? 
 
Our findings indicate that there was no contradiction.  For Khrushchev, what the nuclear revolution 
ultimately meant was its more common-sense, less strategic connotation:  the simple fact that the 
use of these weapons would result in a moral catastrophe and a political absurdity—that, as far as he 
was concerned, a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. This determination leaps 
out from his famous recollection of his response to Kurchatov's report in 1954: 
 
‘I couldn’t sleep for several days,’ Khrushchev recalled. ‘Then I became convinced that we 
could never possibly use these weapons, and when I realized that I was able to sleep 
again.’86 
 
This oft-cited quotation provides us with a good way to characterize our take on the nuclear 
revolution.  Khrushchev's experience suggests that it has manifested itself less in the strategies 
nuclear powers develop, or in the foreign policies they undertake, but rather in the gut conviction 
among leaders actually responsible for pushing the button that when push comes to shove they have 
to find a way to avoid nuclear war—to ‘get out of this mess.’  The Soviet leader cultivated a private 
determination, once he realized what nuclear war actually entailed, that he could ‘never possibly use 
these weapons,’ and set about trying to continue to wage the Cold War with this new purpose in 
mind.  It was a delicate act, and Khrushchev – like his American counterparts – could not know for 
certain he would succeed.  But at the moments of decision – most notably over Berlin in 1959, and 
Cuba in 1962 – he backed away, suppressing considerations of strategy or prestige.  His simple 
determination not to be the man responsible for a war that could destroy humanity explains his 
decisions to step back from the precipice during the grim Cold War showdowns; it is here, we 
argue, where the power of the nuclear revolution really reveals itself. 
 
The visceral effect of nuclear weaponry upon Khrushchev during the most dangerous period of the 
Cold War suggests two broader and related points, both of which speak to the recent debates about 
nuclear strategy today.  First, our particular definition of the nuclear revolution provides a new 
means of contending with its critics.  In short, it demands that in considering the effects of nuclear 
weaponry upon the real world of international politics, we must evaluate what leaders do when it 
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comes to the possibility of nuclear war, not just what their militaries plan for.  It is undeniable that 
Cold War leaders instigated dangerous crises during the 1958-62 period, and that both sides 
continued to build vast weapons systems afterwards.  But what must be weighed against this 
evidence is the clear determination of leaders like Khrushchev to avoid war when the crises 
threatened to get out of hand; and the fact that after 1962 neither superpower risked direct 
confrontation ever again, steering clear of hotspots like Berlin, Cuba, or Korea.  Ronald Reagan, to 
take another example, approved of a massive nuclear buildup during the early 1980s, and engaged 
in belligerent Cold War rhetoric.  Did he therefore believe that the U.S. might be able to win a 
nuclear war?  He had one word for those who really thought this was possible:  ‘crazy.’87   
 
As we have noted, the case for nuclear strategy today depends upon downplaying the salience of the 
nuclear revolution, because these strategies become less attractive if leaders will be too afraid of 
nuclear war to use them.  Scholars who want to make this case, who contend that the historical 
record proves that the nuclear revolution has played little role in the real world of international 
politics, must demonstrate that leaders were not determined to avoid nuclear war, when the 
possibility actually emerged, irrespective of the strategies they had approved or weapons they 
authorised.  Alternatively, they could claim that a determination to avoid major war by leaders of 
great powers is peripheral to the real world of international politics. 
 
Second, our account of the failure of Khrushchev's ‘grand design’ in 1960 highlights a second 
danger inherent in developing war-winning nuclear strategies:  it communicates to nuclear rivals an 
unwillingness to play the game.  To be sure, Khrushchev overreacted to the missile gap politics and 
to the U2 fiasco.  He might have better understood how the American political system rewards 
threat inflation during election campaigns; he might have wondered how the CIA could have 
ensured that Soviet anti-aircraft defenses would shoot down that particular flight on the eve of the 
summit without killing the pilot.  But that does not invalidate the larger point, which is the danger  
that a public policy of war-winning nuclear strategy signals to another nuclear powers one's belief 
in nuclear victory. This threatens not only to trigger dangerous strategic competition, as Lieber and 
Press allow.  It also conveys a kind of disrespect, a dismissal of the other side's status, as occurred 
in 1960.   
 
The aversion of leaders to nuclear war, we suggest, best explains the absence of major conflict 
among nuclear powers over the past seventy years and provides a real-world historical basis for the 
power of the nuclear revolution.  In contemporary debates about nuclear strategy, scholars should 
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